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Facing the Meal-Solution  Dilemma
Ronald B. Larson
Pat James knew she had a challenge  on her hands.
Although all the supermarkets in her district wanted
to  offer  convenient  meal  solutions  (i.e.,  takeout
food),  many  supermarkets  in other areas  who  at-
tempted to  satisfy the consumer's  desire  for pre-
pared food lost money on their ventures. Was there
a way to develop and  market a program or set of
programs  to regain some of the sales volume lost
to the restaurants with drive-thru windows, deliv-
ery, or takeout initiatives? The supermarket chain's
top management had given her the task, expressed
willingness  to  authorize  significant  capital  and
marketing funding, and  suggested that this would
be a test that the rest of the firm would study.
Background
Pat worked  in a  supermarket  during high  school
and part of college.  She interned with a marketing
and  sales  agency  during  her junior year,  but de-
cided that food retailing was a better career for her.
After graduation, she accepted a co-manager posi-
tion at a F.O.O.D. store. F.O.O.D. Stores, Inc., was
started in 1951 by four brothers (Frank, Oliver, Otis,
and Donald) and grew into a regional chain of tra-
ditional neighborhood supermarkets.  The company
focused on businesses  they knew  and did not de-
velop their own distribution system. They had en-
joyed  a  long supply relationship  with  one of the
nation's largest grocery wholesalers.
She worked with one of the most experienced
store managers  for two years and then was given
the opportunity  to  manage  her own  store.  Pat
seemed  to thrive  on the  daily challenges  of store
management  and turned her  store into  one of the
jewels of the chain. Two years ago, after four years
as  a  store  manager,  she  was promoted to  district
manager. Her territory covered an entire state and
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she worked with store managers, co-managers,  as-
sistant managers,  department managers,  and store
associates  to boost each store's performance  and
profits.
In  the  1990s  everything went  quite  well for
F.O.O.D. Stores, Inc. The supermarket industry was
experiencing many consolidations.  The Food Mar-
keting  Institute  (2001a)  reported that the  number
of chain  supermarkets  increased by  19.2  percent
between  1990 and 2000 while the number of inde-
pendent supermarkets fell by 17.2 percent. Between
1980 and 2000, several new retail formats emerged.
Conventional supermarkets declined from account-
ing for 55.2 percent of grocery sales in 1980 to 19.2
percent in 2000 (Griffith  2001, Table  1).  Because
much of the firm's  stock was held by a charitable
foundation set up by the four brothers, management
was able to reject  several  offers  to  sell the com-
pany. However, senior managers knew that it would
be difficult  for a conventional  supermarket  chain
to compete with many of these new retail formats
and they examined various growth options. Besides
helping to assure the firm's survival, they believed
growth reduced labor turnover by creating promo-
tion opportunities and  new challenges  for experi-
enced personnel.
About  six months  ago, F.O.O.D.  Stores, Inc.
made  two acquisitions:  SuperC,  a small chain  of
supercenters that sells food, apparel, hardware, gar-
den  supplies,  electronics,  housewares,  and  many
other items, and FooPha, a regional chain of com-
bination  stores that offers  groceries  along with  a
pharmacy  and health  and beauty  care  items.  Be-
cause  these  acquisitions  doubled  the  size  of
F.O.O.D.  Stores, Inc.,  the purchases required  the
company to take on significant debt. Management
decided to operate  the chains  under their existing
names.  Some  senior positions  were redefined  or
eliminated in an effort to save money and promote
synergies.  Pat's territory  was  changed  from  all
F.O.O.D. stores in one state to all of the stores from
the three chains in one metropolitan area (18 stores
total).  Pat had spent much  of the  last six months
learning about the discount retailing and pharmacy
businesses. She was impressed by the SuperC andFacing  the Meal-Solution Dilemma  47
FooPha store managers in her new district and was
looking forward to the opportunities  and synergies
available to the new, larger retailing firm.
When Pat was a store manager,  the growth in
foodservice sales concerned her. She believed that
restaurants were capturing some volume from tra-
ditional  supermarkets  as  time-pressed  baby-
boomers cut back on meal preparation. At the time,
she  was  unable  to  convince  the  leadership  of
F.O.O.D.  Stores, Inc.  to make major investments
in  prepared  food-what  was  being  called home
meal replacements,  or HMR.  At her store, she in-
creased  the  deli department  display  space  by  10
percent and  offered  additional  items  besides  the
traditional  rotisserie chicken  and pizza.  The  deli
department's profit increase more than covered the
capital  costs  and  the sales  losses  from  the space
reallocated from other departments. Her store's deli
initiative  had  been  replicated  at  many  other
F.O.O.D. stores with similar results. Her deli gross
margins were almost identical to the national aver-
ages: 47.4 percent for the service deli, 50.0 percent
for hot/cold entrees etc. (Turcsik and Heller 2001).
With good cost controls, accurate demand forecasts,
and minimal waste, expanded deli operations could
boost store  profits.  However,  the  below-average
store sizes limited the amount of in-store prepara-
tion to a few entrees and sandwiches.
The  in-store  deli operations  at SuperC  stores
were  similar to those at F.O.O.D.  stores,  and  Pat
believed  their  sales  could  be  increased.  FooPha
stores  never had deli  departments.  Adding  an  in-
store  deli to  a  store would  cost  $250,000  for re-
modeling,  temporarily  reduce  sales  by $150,000
during the construction,  take up 150 square feet of
sales area for preparation  space, and increase labor
costs  by  $100,000  per  year.  The  conservative
FooPha senior management thought the foodservice
Table 1. Store Format Growth Trends between  1980 and 2000.
1980  1980  2000  2000
Number  Share of all  Number  Share of all
of  commodity  of  commodity
Traditional grocery  channel*  of stores  volume (ACV)  stores  volume (ACV)
Conventional  30,250  55.2%  13,000  19.2%
Superstore  3,150  11.6%  7,900  25.6%
Food/drug  combo  475  2.2%  3,650  14.1%
Warehouse  store  920  2.5%  950  2.5%
Super warehouse  7  0.0%  510  3.0%
Limited assortment  750  0.6%  1,485  1.3%
Convenience store  NA  NA  83,500  10.5%
Other  96,000  22.5%  34,600  5.8%
Non-traditional grocery  channel
Hypermarket  NA  NA  7  0.1%
Wholesale club  NA  NA  921  7.9%
Mini club  NA  NA  182  0.2%
Supercenter  NA  NA  1,283  9.3%
Deep discounter  NA  NA  360  0.4%
Internet  NA  NA  80  0.1%
* Refer to source  for format definitions.
Source: Griffith (2001). Reproduced  with permission.
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threat  did not justify these  expenses.  They  were
particularly  concerned  with the  opportunity costs
of the space  including preparation  areas  and pos-
sible guest seating.
Recently many local casual-dining restaurants
in  the  area  (e.g.,  Applebee's,  Bennigan's,  Bob
Evans  Farms,  Chi-Chi's,  Chili's  Grill and  Bar,
Outback Steakhouse, Ruby Tuesday's,  and T.G.I.
Fridays)  boosted their takeout  sales  with  special
menus,  dedicated  takeout  windows,  and  even
curbside delivery. Fast food (quick-service) restau-
rants  were  continuing  to  expand throughout  the
entire market area and were doing brisk drive-thru
business. Pat's  task was  to recommend  strategies
and tactics to respond to the growth in foodservice
sales.
Food Industry Trends
The percentage of household income spent on food
for  at-home  preparation  and  consumption  has
gradually  declined.  In  1955,  15.1  percent  of the
typical household's disposable personal income was
spent on "food at-home." U.S. Department of Ag-
riculture (2002) data, plotted in Figure 1, show this
has now fallen below 7 percent, while spending on
"food  away-from-home"  has  increased  from  3.5
percent to 4.2 percent.
The supermarket industry depends on high sales
volumes  to  survive.  Total  supermarket-industry
sales in 2001 were estimated at $398.2 billion. The
typical shopper made slightly more than two shop-
ping trips to a supermarket per week (Progressive
Grocer  2002). The average transaction in 2000 was
$23.03.  Average  weekly  sales per  square  foot  of
selling area were $10.29. Net profit after taxes was
under 1.3  percent of sales (Food Marketing  Insti-
tute 2001 c).
As restaurant sales have grown, some have sug-
gested that foodservice  will soon capture a major-
ity of the consumer's food spending (Food Distribu-
tors International  2000).  However,  there  has  not
been  a  sudden  shift  in consumer  preferences  for
foodservice.  Research by the National Restaurant
Association (2000) suggested that the average per-
son consumed  3.7 commercially-prepared  meals
per week in  1981  and 4.2 commercially-prepared
meals per week in 2000. Rising prices  have  con-
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tributed  more  to  the  dollar-sales  gains  in
foodservice than did increasing meals away from
home. An important trend has been a large increase
in  takeout  meals.  According  to  the  NPD Group
(2002)  and  Larson  (2002),  takeout  and  delivered
meals  now exceed  on-premise  (i.e.,  "sit-down")
restaurant meals.  Figure 2 shows that off-premise
restaurant meals (takeout)  grew more than 60 per-
cent since  1984 while on-premise  dining declined
slightly. Another National Restaurant Association
(1998)  study found that about 78 percent of U.S.
households made at least one food carryout or de-
livery purchase per month.
Technomic,  Inc.  estimated  the  total  takeout
food category sales (excluding beverages,  snacks,
and desserts) in 2000 to be $99.0 billion. Although
annual supermarket takeout food sales totaled $14.0
billion,  sales  growth  in  supermarkets  was 5 per-
cent, slightly  below the 6 percent  growth for the
category (ID,  2002). Several consulting groups pro-
jected significant growth for the meal-solution,  or
HMR,  market. For example,  McKinsey and Com-
pany predicted supermarket foodservice  sales will
increase by 3.8 percent per year through 2010 (Food
Distributors  International 2000).
As Pat studied trends in the meal-solution mar-
ket,  she  identified the major buyers  of supermar-
ket-prepared  food.  A Food Marketing  Institute
(2001b) survey suggests that 18 percent of the popu-
lation  used  supermarkets  as their primary  source
of takeout food. Older shoppers were slightly more
likely to rely on the supermarket for takeout food
than were younger shoppers. For supermarket-pre-
pared  foods,  Spectra  consumption  indices  for all
nine lifestyle classes of household heads  aged 18
to 34 with children exceeded  120, and all the indi-
ces for household heads aged 18 to 34 without chil-
dren were below 90 (Warren 2001). This suggests
that families are major prepared-food buyers. How-
ever, the majority of takeout meals were consumed
by adults, not by time-stressed parents at meals with
their children  (Larson  1999). Often  a household's
decision to have  a takeout  meal was made in the
evening at home instead of at work or on the drive
home. Household members would discuss what to
have for dinner and then decide whether to make
or purchase  the meal (Larson  1999).
Pat studied a report (Hale Group,  Ltd.  1998)
that looked at HMR operations  at stores from sev-
eral supermarket chains and concluded that the av-
Figure 2. Annual Foodservice  Meals  On-Premises and Off-Premises.
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erage  store  was losing  $19,000  per year on meal
solutions.  She also knew that several chains were
pleased with the image enhancement and store traf-
fic generated by their HMR programs. Hopefully,
her firm could  learn from other chains  and avoid
some mistakes.
Pat read a paper (Larson  1998)  that described
seven key "P's" for marketing HMR products: po-
sitioning, product,  package,  place,  price,  promo-
tion, and people. She knew her proposal to F.O.O.D.
Stores,  Inc.  management  would  use  all of these
tools. These seven keys were developed further in
another paper  she read  (Larson  2002).  However,
Pat also had to address  two  other "P's": procure-
ment and politics.  Her proposal to the meal-solu-
tion  dilemma  would need  to  include  who  would
produce  the prepared  foods  and how  the  items
would reach the stores. Addressing these logistics
issues and dealing with the tradeoffs between effi-
ciency  and  consumer  acceptance  would be  chal-
lenging.  Integrating  foodservice  into  traditional
grocery operations would require some changes and
compromises  by department  managers.  She  also
would have to deal with cultural differences among
the three  recently  combined  chains  and involve
F.O.O.D., SuperC, and FooPha store managers and
associates in the process.
Market Profile
Even though Pat had lived in the metropolitan area
for many years, she gathered information about the
market  from  several  sources  including  the  latest
Survey of Buying  Power  (Sales and Marketing
Management 2001). About one and a half million
people lived in the metropolitan area. The age dis-
tribution was similar to the U.S. average. Food-and-
beverage  store  sales  in the area totaled  $3  billion
(the three chains combined had a 20-percent share
of food-and-beverage  store  sales).  The  median
household  effective  buying  income  (EBI)  was
$40,000;  about 45 percent  of households  have  an
EBI of at least $50,000. Five-year projections had
the market  growing  slightly  faster than the  U.S.
average in both population and EBI per household.
Census estimates  suggested the market was some-
what more  diverse  than  the U.S.  average, with  a
greater proportion of both African-Americans  and
Hispanics.
Figure 3 shows the location of the stores in the
metropolitan area. F.O.O.D. stores were located in
some of the older neighborhoods  in the center of
the market. The households in the Southeast quad-
rant had the lowest average income in the market,
about 20 percent below  the  market  average.  The
Figure 3.  F.O.O.D.  Stores, Inc., Supermarkets in the Metro District.
SC = SuperC stores
FP = FooPha stores
FD = F.O.O.D. Stores
Com = Potential  location of a
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Southwest quadrant had the highest concentration
of minorities.  In the  1960s, a beltline highway was
built around the city. It was about 40 miles around
and helped reduce traffic congestion  in the center
of the city.
SuperC  started as a discount retailer and built
stores  at the  intersections  of the  beltline  and  the
main highways to the center of the city. At the time,
these areas were  quite rural.  However,  as the city
grew  and  suburbs evolved,  the  highways  next to
SuperC  store locations had very high traffic. Driv-
ing  straight  from  SuperC  store  SC1  to  SC3  was
about  16  miles;  from  SC2  to  SC4 was  about  10
miles. SuperC stores were remodeled in the 1990s.
Stores  were  expanded  to  200,000  square  feet  of
selling  area  and  traditional  supermarket  depart-
ments were added.
FooPha  stores  were  built  along  the beltline
highway in the suburbs during the early 1980s. Each
store was located about 5 miles from a SuperC store
in  the  heart  of a thriving,  upper-middle-income
suburb. They had about 40,000 square feet of sell-
ing  area and handled  about 50,000 items, exclud-
ing the pharmacy.  FooPha stores faced  some stiff
competition from other upscale supermarket chains
in the same  suburbs.  Most of these stores offered
some prepared foods, but it was clearly not an area
they were stressing. In contrast, many conventional,
independent competitors of F.O.O.D. stores closed
in the 1990s when SuperC entered the grocery busi-
ness.  The  most  serious  grocery  competition  in
F.O.O.D.  store neighborhoods  was  coming  from
convenience  stores.
Options to Consider
The  first  issue Pat examined  was where  the  pre-
pared food should be made (and who should make
it). One possible synergy from the acquisition could
involve using  the excess  in-store baking capacity
of the  SuperC  stores to supply  fresh baked goods
to FooPha  and F.O.O.D.  stores.  With  gross mar-
gins typically  over 50 percent, expanding in-store
bakery sales could boost chain profits  (Heller and
Major 2002). The SuperC bakers arrive at the stores
before 5 a.m.  and usually have finished baking by
9  a.m.  Customers  who  shop  SuperC  after  noon
never experience the aroma of fresh baked breads.
Some chains use the sights and smells of food prepa-
ration  (i.e.,  eatertainment)  to promote their prod-
ucts  (Miller  2001).  Implementing  this  tactic  at
SuperC stores would require spreading the baking
out over the entire day.
Entree preparation posed different challenges.
F.O.O.D.  stores lacked  the space  to  expand their
delis, and FooPha stores did not have food-prepa-
ration  space.  It might  be possible  to  have  each
F.O.O.D.  store  specialize  in one  item  and share
products between the stores, but they probably  do
not have  the  capacity  to  supply  FooPha  stores.
SuperC stores could serve as satellite producers and
supply FooPha and F.O.O.D. store locations. How-
ever,  if sales  for meal  solutions  took  off,  it was
unclear if SuperC's facilities could meet the meal-
solution demand  for both chains.  It might also be
politically difficult to convince  stores that were ri-
vals until six months ago to start depending on each
other  for items  that could become major features
for the stores.
Some chains had built their own commissaries
(central kitchens) to supply their stores. Pat believed
meal-solution  demand  in  this  area was  strong
enough to keep  a small,  dedicated facility  operat-
ing efficiently.  Before the  acquisitions,  F.O.O.D.
Stores, Inc. had purchased  land near the center  of
the city for an eleventh  store. The acquisitions put
the construction  plan  on hold,  and the location
would be ideal for a  commissary. Building a new
commissary  would  cost about  $1 million.  Senior
managers  would compare the profit  forecasts and
risks from a commissary with the more-certain  re-
turns  from  a new  store,  possibly  making  a com-
missary harder to sell despite  having  50-percent-
lower capital costs. Pat read in the newspaper that
a local  school  district  had built  a large  central
kitchen  and was  interested  in preparing  food for
clients. A central kitchen in the area that prepared
meals for airlines and prisons also had extra capac-
ity. Pat met with the managers  of both operations
and  concluded  that  either of them  could  provide
basic prepared  foods  for F.O.O.D.,  FooPha, and
SuperC  stores.  However,  she  was not convinced
they could produce high-quality "gourmet"  foods
that some store managers wanted.  There were also
smaller  catering kitchens  in the area,  including  a
few with upscale "signature" dishes, that could pro-
vide  some products.  However,  at  this time  each
appeared to lack the capacity to meet all the meal-
solution needs of even one of the three chains. This
raised the question  of what brand name  or names
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to use  on the products.  Pat also thought  "out-of-
the-box"  and wondered  if any  local  restaurants
would be interested in renting space  in F.O.O.D.,
FooPha, or SuperC stores to sell takeout.  She was
uncertain how senior managers would react to this
idea.
Another  issue  was  managing  deliveries.  Pat
knew that consumers wanted  fresh foods, so daily
delivery of the prepared foods probably  would be
required.  For  some hot items,  multiple  deliveries
each day  may  be necessary.  Asking  department
managers to order from multiple suppliers each day
and "fast  track"  the  perishable  deliveries  around
the other products arriving at the stores (both from
the wholesaler and from direct store-delivery ven-
dors) would create some resistance. A system could
be  needed to  simplify  the  process  and  minimize
order errors.
Pat knew that out-of-stocks (OOS) could be a
major  problem  for  meal  solutions.  Based  on her
deli experience,  she believed that about half of the
customers who were interested in a particular pre-
pared item  and  did not  find it would  switch to  a
different item; the other half would leave  the deli
department without making a purchase. About half
the customers  who left (25 percent of the custom-
ers not finding their preferred  item) were unlikely
to  consider  the  deli department  again  when  they
were interested in buying prepared food. The other
half would give the department  one more chance.
If the item they were seeking was OOS again, they
would not return  to shop for prepared food  in the
deli  department.  About  20 percent  of those  who
switched (10 percent of the customers not finding
an item) would also only give the department  one
more chance  to have the prepared food item they
wanted in stock. If it was OOS  again, they would
find  a different source  for prepared foods.
Several steps could be taken to minimize OOS.
Selecting good suppliers  can help. Suppliers must
have adequate capacity to meet the peak demands
by the stores. Store personnel need to make accu-
rate forecasts of each day's sales and suppliers must
have sufficient flexibility to increase production on
short notice.  Orders could be  placed  in the  after-
noon of one day with deliveries  expected the next
morning.  Multiple  deliveries  each  day  may be
needed to maintain product freshness and keep OOS
under control.
A related issue was the assortment of prepared
food  items that  F.O.O.D.,  FooPha,  and  SuperC
stores  would carry.  Specializing  in  a  few  items
could simplify production,  ordering, delivery,  and
merchandising.  Larger assortments  (e.g., multiple
entrees  with a variety of side dishes and desserts)
would require more backroom space for inventory.
Some key items should be available at every store
in a chain. Perhaps some stores should carry a larger
assortment than other stores. Although  consumers
like variety, too much variety would increase prod-
uct waste (i.e., because customers want fresh food,
few prepared items can be held more than 30 hours).
For each linear foot of prepared-food display space,
Pat estimated  they would need at least one square
foot of backroom  inventory space.  Increasing the
quantity of product  on  display or the  size  of the
backroom hot- and chilled-food holding areas could
reduce the need for multiple deliveries  every day.
Deliveries would be easier to handle if F.O.O.D.
Stores, Inc. contracted with an outside firm to pick
up the prepared  food items  from each source and
deliver them to each store. The contract would de-
pend on the number of source locations and the fre-
quency of the  deliveries.  Alternatively,  F.O.O.D.
Stores, Inc.  could lease a fleet of trucks and have
their own staff handle the products.  Pat estimated
the total cost of delivering their own products to be
about $2 per mile plus labor. Having their own de-
livery system may present other opportunities. For
example,  a few stores in  other cities  deliver gro-
ceries to large business parking lots  at the end of
the work day.  Because the businesses  considered
this an employee  benefit,  they set up a system for
employees  to  order groceries  using their  intranet
and pay using payroll deduction.  To better utilize
their trucks, F.O.O.D. Stores,  Inc. could offer pre-
pared-food and grocery deliveries at the end of  plant
shifts at three large employers  inside the beltline.
More radical opportunities include delivering pre-
pared foods to convenience stores, snack bars, food
kiosks, sporting concessions, vending machines, or
directly to customer homes.
Product quality and branding are two interre-
lated issues that Pat needed to examine. She thought
that the prepared foods sold at F.O.O.D. stores need
to be clearly positioned as convenient food, home-
meal  replacements  (e.g.,  "food  like Mom's"),  or
restaurant-meal replacements.  SuperC stores could
also consider the other positioning options such as
quality  and  freshness,  service,  expertise,  or vari-
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ety. Given FooPha store locations, they might also
explore the positioning options of natural, organic,
gourmet, or nutritious foods. Each chain could con-
duct  surveys,  focus groups,  and taste  tests to de-
velop menus  and recipes  that appeal to their  cus-
tomers. Although there were efficiency advantages
from  creating  a  single brand for all  the  stores,  it
might be better to develop three separate prepared-
food brands that differentiated the stores from com-
petitors and reinforced their positionings.
Staffing was still another issue that needed to
be incorporated  into Pat's proposal.  Some  chains
tried  entertaining  customers  with their  HMR de-
partments,  hiring  chefs  who  "performed"  while
shoppers selected their meals. The chefs reinforced
the freshness and quality images the chains desired.
However,  the sales gains usually did not justify the
costs,  and in many cases the supermarket  culture,
with its  focus on  inventory  control  and  margins,
clashed with chefs who were particularly creative.
In addition, store-based production limited the flex-
ibility at each store. If a chef resigned, was sick, or
went  on  vacation,  a  store would  have  difficulty
maintaining  quality.  Central  kitchens  simplified
human-resource,  quality-control,  and  food-safety
issues.  A few stores prepared some  foods in their
delis  throughout the  day and  sourced most items
from outside suppliers. This did not require as much
staff training as having full in-store preparation. For
example,  to  reinforce  FooPha's  quality  image  it
would be possible to have a chef work at a portable
station  slicing ham for  sandwiches  at  lunch  and
entrees at dinner; other meal components would be
delivered  from outside suppliers.  The annual cost
for a  chef and  a  portable  station  could  exceed
$70,000  per  store.  Other  companies  had  sold
branded  and freshness-dated  prepared  foods from
outside  firms in cold and hot cases without any in-
store  preparation.  Pat could  see  the benefits  and
limitations  of each option.
The deadline  for Pat's proposal and presenta-
tion  was  getting near.  There were  still many  op-
tions  to weigh and  she was  sure there  were other
excellent  opportunities  she had not identified.  Pat
wanted to develop  a viable meal  solution strategy
for the company and propose marketing tactics that
fit that strategy. What should she propose?
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Teaching Note for "Facing the Meal-Solution  Dilemma"
This case was developed to help readers better un-
derstand  many aspects  of U.S.  food retailing and
to provide them with an opportunity to use market-
ing and  logistics principles  to  address  a realistic
problem.  Unlike  other case  studies  that provide
sufficient  information  to make  fact-based  recom-
mendations, this case tries to expose readers to the









of new products  or services.  Readers  must make
assumptions and can gather additional information
that may support or refute their assumptions.  Case
discussions can be organized around the nine "P's"
that were mentioned in the case. Each "P"  includes
several issues that should be considered.  Some of
these issues are listed below:
Issues to be considered
How should the meal-solution  initiative(s) be described to customers?
What positioning(s) should the chains use for their meal-solution programs?
What products and how much variety should each store carry?
What brand(s) should be on the items (one brand, different brands for each chain,
different brands for each producer of the meal-solution  items etc.)?
What package colors,  shapes, sizes, and materials will boost attractiveness?
What information should be included on the package?
Where  should the meal solutions be sold?
How much preparation, display, backroom, and guest-seating space will be needed
in each store?
What merchandising  (and cross-merchandising)  tactics should be used?
How should the prepared-food  items be priced?
Should prices for similar items vary by chain?
What promotions  should each chain use to build trial?
Who  is the primary target for the promotions?
How will the chains increase repeat purchases?
Who will serve the customers  in the stores?
What training should be provided to the prepared-food program staff?
Procurement
Politics
Where  should the  items  be produced  (in  all  stores,  in  some  stores,  in  a private
commissary,  in a F.O.O.D.  commissary, in several  central kitchens etc.)?
How can sales forecasts be improved and order errors be minimized?
Who should deliver the items and how often should deliveries  be made?
How can managers and associates at all the stores be involved in the planning and
implementation  process?
How can traditional  foodservice processes be integrated into the supermarket sys-
tem and culture?
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